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Summary
Since the turn of the millennium, China has become
an increasingly important economic and political
power in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Although China has
unequivocally come in search of natural resources,
its mission is undoubtedly deeper, broader, and more
considerable, given the establishment of institutional
mechanisms such as the Forum on China Africa
Cooperation.  China has come with new development modalities, but also with a poor environmental
record. This has meant increased investment and trade
for African nations, as well as serious environmental
challenges that must be addressed. China is also determined to become a leader in green technologies, and
Africa is one of its testing grounds.  This holds the
promise of modernization that does not put additional
pressures on our already fragile environment; a development the international community should applaud.
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A

lthough the People’s Republic of China has been
investing in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) since the
1960s,1 the pace, shape, and scope of this investment have increased exponentially since the beginning
of the millennium.2 Roads and other types of infrastructure, including energy projects, are being built, along
with schools and hospitals, as China expands both trade
and foreign direct investment (FDI) in SSA.3 While this
development is linked to China’s need for energy, minerals, and other commodities, it is much more expansive
and has been accompanied by a far-reaching political and
diplomatic effort to establish close ties, partnerships, and
friendly relations with African governments.4 It may herald
a new era for many African countries and will undoubtedly have many important consequences for the nations
and peoples of SSA. Our focus, however, will be the environmental consequences of this growing association.
As a rising economic power, China is in search of natural resources to fuel its phenomenal growth, and it has
come to Africa for those resources. This is a familiar role for
SSA, which has long been a source for natural resources,5
as Europeans exploited the continent first as colonizers
and then, with other Western nations, as developers and
investors.  Unfortunately, extractive industries are often
environmentally sensitive, and Chinese companies may
be investing in areas that were previously inaccessible or
judged too environmentally problematic by Western entities. Thus, projects may sometimes be even more environmentally challenging than usual. Moreover, oil and other
fossil fuels emit greenhouse gases (GHG) that are intensifying climate change, and thus oil extraction and use is
particularly dubious, even if it is highly probable African
1.	

2.	

3.	
4.	
5.	

Formal links between China and SSA began with the Bangdung Conference in 1955.  Until the mid-1990s, however, aid was directed toward
liberation movements and further isolating Taiwan. Since the mid-1990s,
aid has increasingly been focused on broader strategic objectives, including
developing relations with resource rich nations.  Raphael Kaplinsky et al.,
The Impact of China on Sub Saharan Africa 22 (DFID China Office, Apr. 
2006); Martyn Davies, How China Is Influencing Africa’s Development 5
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Centre, Apr. 2010).
Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China
in Africa 2 (Oxford Univ.  Press 2010).  This continued throughout the
global financial crisis, which may have only accelerated Chinese investment
in Africa. In the first half of 2009, during the height of the economic crisis, Chinese investment in Africa increased 81%, compared with the same
period the year before. Davies, supra note 1, at 5. See also Jennifer Cooke,
China’s Soft Power in Africa, in China’s Soft Power and Its Implication
for the United States: Cooperation and Competition in the Developing World 27, 29 (Carola McGiffert ed., 2009).
Cooke, supra note 2, at 29.
Id. China has explicitly committed to expanding trade and investment opportunities with Africa, and it has made good on its commitments.
Africa contains about 30% of the world’s mineral reserves, 40% of its gold,
60% of its cobalt, and 90% of global platinum reserves. See Mining and Oil
Extraction in Africa, Eoearth.org (Apr.  12, 2007), http://www.eoearth.
org/article/Mining_and_oil_extraction_in_Africa (last visited Oct.  23,
2012) (discussing Africa’s mineral wealth).
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oil extracted by China would have been extracted in any
event.6 Weak recipient governments may hesitate to insist
upon, or simply lack, sufficient regulatory capabilities to
impose adequate environmental laws and regulations,
while as a newly industrializing nation, China may not
bring the soundest environmental practices to its activities.
Perhaps, because it is currently in the midst of its
own industrialization, China refuses to play by Western
development rules or to be bound by international environmental standards. Instead, it is utilizing new development modalities and is employing a more respectful and
cooperative mindset in its dealings with African nations.7
It seems these techniques may be more effective than Western methodologies, raising the prospect of some measure of
modernization for a continent that had largely been written off by many commentators and scholars.8 Industrialization inevitably affects the environment whether positively
or negatively, albeit often negatively, making it in the interests of the wider international community that this growth
take place in as sustainable a manner as possible. Despite
acute environmental problems in some of its current African investments, China may still be poised to help make
this happen.
Even as China has become the leading emitter of GHGs,
it has begun to focus on steps to reverse this trend and
also to deal with domestic environmental degradation. It
is determined to become a leader in green technologies to
address rising GHG emissions at home and abroad, and,
as part of its strategy, to overtake the West in the nascent
technologies that are likely to dominate a more ecologically
conscious world. China is already the leading producer and
exporter of green energy technologies, such as solar, wind,
and water power,9 and has explicitly committed to bringing
this expertise to SSA. Not only is China the leading producer of large hydropower in SSA, but it has also pledged
to construct 100 clean energy projects, focusing on small
hydropower, wind farms, and solar power.10 Expanding
SSA’s potential for clean energy can play a significant role
in increasing African electrification rates while simultaneously opening a development path geared toward resource
conservation and climate sustainability.11 If SSA becomes
6.	

China’s share of total African oil production is 9%, while the U.S. share is
32% and Europe’s share is 33%. Cooke, supra note 2, at 30.
7.	 Having been on the receiving end of colonial domination may also contribute to China’s viewpoint.
8.	 Africa has been the subject of quite positive commentary as of late. See, e.g.,
Africa Rising, After Decades of Slow Growth, Africa Has a Real Chance to Follow in the Footsteps of Asia, Economist, Dec. 3, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21541015/ (last visited Oct.  23, 2012).  See also Brautigam, supra note 2, at 2.
9.	 Chinese banks and companies are now the largest financiers and constructors of global hydropower projects, investing billions of dollars annually
on large dams in developing countries. See Nicole Brewer, The New Great
Walls: A Guide to China’s Overseas Dam Industry, Int’l Rivers (July 2008),
available at http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/new_
great_walls_report.pdf (discussing the impact Chinese investors have had
on global infrastructure development).
10. See infra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
11. Bjorn Conrad et al., Towards an Energizing Partnership? Exploring China’s
Role as Catalyst of Renewable Energy Development in Africa, Global Public Policy Inst. 7 (May 2011), available at http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/
media/pub/2011/conrad-et-al_2011_sino-african-energy-relations.pdf.
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a proving ground for green energy, it may become one of
the most important examples of sustainable development
to date, even if a looming warming climate belies the
entire notion of sustainability. If the poorest countries are
to modernize, meaning if they are to gain any semblance of
access to the benefits and burdens of industrialization, this
might be the soundest means by which this can transpire,
and it should be encouraged and supported by the international community.
This Article will examine and analyze these developments.  Part I explores the scope and nature of China’s
engagement with SSA.  Although oil and other natural
resources are an important part of this mosaic, China
has much broader interests, as evidenced by the establishment and ever-deepening agenda and work of the Forum
on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and its relationships with more than 45 African nations, many of which
are resource-poor.12 China’s policies in Africa are closely
linked to its meteoric economic rise, the need for natural resources to fuel this growth, and its role as a rising
world power.  As a nation in the midst of modernization
that has itself endured colonial domination, it has undertaken a decidedly different approach to African countries
than that adopted by Western powers and has refused to
accept Western development paradigms.  This makes the
China-Africa relationship much less amenable to Western
pressure and interference and, given African preferences
for the Chinese model, may actually pressure international
financial institutions (IFIs) to change their policies, thus
making China’s evolving environmental policies all the
more important.
Part II turns to the environmental consequences of this
engagement. It begins with a brief examination of China’s
domestic environmental policies, which in the absence of
international or strong target-country standards may have
a significant effect on Chinese FDI in SSA. Moreover, a significant part of Chinese trade and FDI in SSA are state-led,
and thus state policies may be especially relevant.  China
maintains a posture of non-interference and thus relies on
domestic laws to define environmental protection parameters, rather than international standards, which it views
as Western standards.  Still, it may be that there is some
convergence, which will also be explored.  Part III turns
to promising environmental possibilities regarding China’s
engagement in SSA. As a continent in need of energy joins
forces with a nation determined to be a world leader in
green technologies, the possibilities for greener development are substantial.  Finally, Part IV will conclude with
general observations on the potential and pitfalls of China’s
venture into SSA and its implications for the nations and
peoples of this long-neglected region.
12. The FOCAC is a collective dialogue platform for cooperation between China and African nations based on equality and mutual benefit that seeks to
promote economic and social development. Chris Alden, Background Notes
on FOCAC 9-11, in 3 Bulletin of Fridays of the Commission (Jan. 
2010), available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/ua/Newsletter/EA/
Fridays_of_the_Commission/2010/AUC%20Vol1%20FF%20Low%20
Res.pdf.

12-2012

I.

NEWS & ANALYSIS

The Evolving Relationship Between
China and the Nations of SSA

A.

42 ELR 11111

The Broader Political Milieu

China’s rapid rise as a global economic power has been one
of the most significant global economic developments of
the last 20 years.13 China abandoned its centrally planned
socialist economy in favor of a market-based system, albeit
one with Chinese characteristics,14 successfully embarking
on a path of rapid modernization that has transformed an
agrarian nation into an industrializing colossus that is a
leading global manufacturing center and one of the world’s
largest exporters.15 This unprecedented economic surge has
had tremendous repercussions for the entire world economy, reconfiguring global trade and economic relations.16
It has also unleashed South-South economic cooperation
and collaboration, which have been flourishing as middleincome Southern Tier nations increasingly undertake economic activities in poorer Southern Tier countries.17 China
has been especially determined on this front, actively
pursuing economic and political relationships across the
Global South,18and SSA has been an important part of this
trajectory.

It is readily apparent that China’s objectives in Africa are
not altruistic; it is seeking resources and developing economic partnerships to fuel its growth.  While resources
are a priority, there is undoubtedly also a much broader
dimension to China’s engagement with SSA and a different approach to obtaining those needed resources. China
is in Africa for the long, deep haul and seems determined
to fashion a wide-ranging, enduring relationship with
African nations. In 2000, President Hu Jintao launched
the FOCAC to promote economic cooperation between
Africa and China, and it has become a key institutional
mechanism undergirding the multidimensional relationship between China and approximately 45 African
nations.19 At the FOCAC’s triennial meetings, China has
set forth three-year plans20 that frame a comprehensive
set of economic cooperation polices and enable regular
dialogue and high-level meetings between Beijing and
African heads of state.21 China has undertaken an expansive range of obligations to African nations, ranging from
political and international affairs22 to economic and social

13. See, e.g., Ali Zafar, The Growing Relationship Between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, Trade Investment, and Aid Links, 22(1) World
Bank Research Observer 103, 104 (2007).
14. Brautigam, supra note 2, at 7-8; F. Urban et al., China and the African Oil
Sector: Channels of Engagement, Motives, Actors, and Impacts (IDS Working Paper, Vol. 2011, No. 374 (Sept. 2011), at 8.
15. See, e.g., Stefanie Beyer, Environmental Law and Policy in the People’s Republic
of China, 5 Chinese J. Int’l L. 185, 187 (2006). “The planning that once
dominated Chinese trade during the 1980s has given way to a decentralized,
market-determined trading system.” Brautigam, supra note 2, at 74.
16. Zafar, supra note 13, at 104.  In 2010, China surpassed Japan to become
the world’s second largest economy. Chester Dawson & Jason Dean, Rising
China Bests a Shrinking Japan, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 2011, http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704593604576140912411499184.
html (last visited Oct.  24, 2012).  Growing at an average rate of 10%, it
is predicted that China will surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy by 2016.  Mark Weisbrot, 2016: When China Overtakes the
US, Guardian U.K., Apr. 27, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/apr/27/china-imf-economy-2016 (last visited Oct. 
24, 2012).
17. There are other rising economic powers, and the largest, Brazil, Russia, and
India, along with China, have been termed BRICs, or according to some
commentators, BRICS, which includes South Africa.  They have become
important participants in the world economy and, given the economic
woes of Europe and the United States, appear set to play an even larger
role in low-income countries. They have also driven a resource boom. Reza
Moghadam, New Growth Drivers for Low-Income Countries: The
Role of BRICs 9 (Strategy, Policy, and Review Department, International
Monetary Fund (IMF), Jan. 12, 2011).
18. The phrases Global South or Southern Tier refer to non-Western nations
that share a history of colonialism or other forms of subjugation, have
middle or low incomes, and tend to be populated by people of color. These
nations are often referred to as developing countries, least-developed countries, undeveloped countries, and the like, as opposed to the industrialized,
Western, and usually white, developed, or Northern Tier nations of the
Global North.  I have written extensively about development and prefer
not to use the term “developing,” although sometimes it is unavoidable. 
See Ruth Gordon & Jon H. Sylvester, Deconstructing Development, 22 Wis. 
Int’l L.  Rev. 1 (2004).  Moreover, the term has become increasingly unstable with the rise of middle-income, industrializing nations, which are also
referred to as emerging markets, Second World, or newly industrializing nations. This group includes Brazil, Chile, China, India, Panama, Singapore,
South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, and others.

19. Davies, supra note 1, at 6. There have been five summits, the first four held
in Beijing (October 2000 and November 2006), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
(December 2003), and Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt (2009). The FOCAC was
plainly part of a larger strategy to systematically and continuously engage
the Global South, as the FOCAC model has been repeated in comparable
forums, such as the China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation
Forum (2003), the Forum on Cooperation Between China and Arab States
(2004), and the China-Pacific Islands Economic Development Forum
(2006). Id. at 87. FOCAC IV was held in Beijing in July 2012.
20. Id. at 6. Martyn Davies maintains that it is only because China is engaged
in state-led capitalism that it can make broad pronouncements, because it
can exert control over state enterprises. Others have taken a more nuanced
approach, noting that while China has more control over its private sector than most other states, there is more independence in broad swaths of
the private sector than this statement indicates. Still, central and provincial
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have played a large role in China’s FDI in
SSA. See generally Raphael Kaplinsky & Mike Morris, Chinese FDI in SubSaharan Africa: Engaging With Large Dragons, 21 Eur. J. Dev. Res. 551, 555
(2009).
21. Brautigam, supra note 2, at 127-28. The first forum held in Beijing included nearly 80 foreign ministers from 45 African countries. The first action
plan focused on intergovernmental relations, trade and investment, infrastructure, financial cooperation, debt relief, tourism, migration, agriculture,
natural resources and energy, science and technology, medical care and public health, education and human resource development, the environment,
and cooperation in multilateral forums. A small institutional body was established to evaluate progress on implementation. FOCAC II (Addis Abba
December 2003) brought Action Plan 2004-2006, which reorganized the
extensive list of matters demarcated at FOCAC I into three main categories:
political affairs; multilateral cooperation; and economic development; 44
African nations attended and economic development was the largest part of
the equation with infrastructure; trade and investment; health and agriculture and energy development being priorities. The final declaration called
for enhanced South-South cooperation, greater North-South dialogue to
promote African development, and reforming United Nations (U.N.) agencies, such as the World Bank and the IMF. FOCAC III (Beijing November
2006) also detailed a large number of concrete tasks. Alden, supra note 12,
at 9, 9-10.
22. Political cooperation includes high-level meetings, political dialogue and
FOCAC meetings between foreign ministers in conjunction with the fall
U.N. General Assembly General Debate, and other measures to promote
contacts between legislatures and local governments. These meetings have
been successful, the institutional mechanism to support the FOCAC has
progressed, and a China-Africa Chamber of Commerce and Industry has
been established. Alden, supra note 12, at 10-11.
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development.23 China has generally kept its promises, not
only realizing its commitments, but often doing so ahead
of schedule and going beyond initial promises and targets.24 China has also furnished unprecedented levels of
debt relief and other forms of financial assistance, including preferential loans and grants (in kind) to build public
infrastructure projects.25
These relationships will make it increasingly difficult for
Western institutions to have a substantial influence over
Chinese policies in Africa. Despite consistent and considerable criticism from Western nations, commentators, and
media, many African governments view China as an alternative to Western arrogance and officiousness. Even if it is
not a relationship between equals,26 China is interacting
with African nations within a deepening network that also
encompasses numerous cultural and social ties.27 Certainly,
China’s need for natural resources has reinforced SSA’s status as a source of natural resources to fuel global manufacturing.28 In this respect, China’s FDI in SSA is similar
to the involvement of Western governments and corporations in Africa both during and after the colonial era.29
Yet, China seems more willing to pay for these resources
at a fairer price, namely the modernization African nations
crave. In other words, why appropriate when it is far easier
and less costly to pay a reasonable price?30
23. Economic cooperation is the most important category, with agriculture, investment, and business cooperation, trade, finance, infrastructure, energy
resources, science and technology, information, air, and maritime transport
at its core. Social development integrates development assistance and debt
relief, human resources development, culture, education, medical care, environmental protection, tourism, people to people exchanges, and cooperation in news and media. Id. at 10.
24. Id. at 11.
25. These projects include ministry buildings, courts, hospitals, stadiums, and
convention centers. Peter Bosshard, China’s Environmental Footprint in Africa, 4, 10 (John Hopkins Univ., African Studies Program, Working Paper,
2008).
26. In 2005, China’s economic size measured in terms of purchasing power was
more than five times that of SSA.  Zafar, supra note 13, at 106.  Western
commentators have criticized the power lopsidedness of the FOCAC and
between African nations and China in general. Ian Taylor, From Santa Claus
to Serious Business: Where Should FOCAC Go Next?, Quo Vadis FOCAC?
The Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the Forum on China African Cooperation Beijing, 31 (Centre for Chinese Studies, July 2012), available at http://
www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/China_Monitor_FOCAC_
Special_Edition_JULY_2012_FINAL.pdf.
27. African students are attending Chinese universities and are being trained
as, inter alia, doctors, teachers, and engineers. There are also Chinese medical teams, teachers, and technicians assisting African governments. Cooke,
supra note 2, at 33-35.
28. Rene N’Guettia Kouassi, Can Chinese Pragmatism Lead the European Union
to Reformulate Its Co-Operation Policy With Africa, in 3 China & Africa: Assessing the Relationship on the Eve of the Fourth Forum on China
Africa Co-operation (FOCAC IV) 3, 7 (The Bulletin of Fridays of the
Commission, Jan.  2010) (noting that Africa needs a strategy, lest Africa
become a Sino-European battleground for raw materials to fuel industry
and markets for their manufactured goods).
29. Bosshard, supra note 25, at 4. See also Ruth Gordon & Jon H.  Sylvester,
Deconstructing Development, 22 Wis. Int’l L. Rev. 1 (2004).
30. In some respects, China is patterning its development relationship with SSA
on its former relationship with Japan and other Asian development modalities. Japan and China utilized resource-based loans, where China supplied
Japan with natural resources while Japan assisted China’s modernization efforts. One of many differences between Asian states and the West has been
the idea of the governmental state, where state entities are a more important
element of the development mix. Brautigam, supra note 2, at 13, 18; Conrad et al., supra note 11, at 24-25.

B.

12-2012

Trade and Investment

Since at least the turn of the millennium, China has built
a network of trade, aid, and investment relationships with
almost 50 African countries.31 The pace has been quite
remarkable, with trade growing at a rate of 33% per year
between 2000 and 2008,32 making China Africa’s third
largest trading partner, surpassed only by the United
States and the European Union (EU).33 Oil is becoming an
increasingly important part of China’s energy mix and is
its leading import from SSA, with a large portion of African exports coming from the oil-producing countries of
Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and Sudan.34
China also imports other natural resources, however,
including minerals, metals, and agro-forestry products,
and has trade relations with 35 countries, many of which
are not oil-rich.35
As trade has surged, so has Chinese FDI, which is
expanding at a rate that exceeds its investment in any other
part of the world.36 FDI has advanced along four broad
channels: energy and mineral resources; infrastructure;
global production networks; and small-scale entrepreneurial ventures.37 Private firms have concentrated on manufacturing and service industries, and the scale of private
projects is significant and rising.38 By the end of 2008, the
cumulative net stock of Chinese investment reached $7.8
billion dollars in more than 35 countries.39
Manufacturing and resource-based investments have
been in place since the 1980s, but 2000 marked a substan31. Zafar, supra note 13, at 110-14.
32. China-Africa trade increased from $10.6 billion in 2000 to $106.8 billion
in 2008.  Chinese exports reached $5.8 billion, and imports from Africa
were $56 billion. Conrad et al., supra note 11, at 23.
33. Urban, supra note 14. China had more than $100 billion in trade with SSA
in 2008.
34. In 2005, 20% of SSA’s raw materials and 15% of its fuel exports went to
China. Approximately 85% of Africa’s exports to China are from five oil-exporting countries, and according to some estimates, 50% of China’s investments are concentrated in a handful of countries that have natural resources. 
Urban, supra note 14, at 10.
35. Urban, supra note 14, at 10.  In 2008, 82% of Africa’s exports to China
included mineral products, including oil and gas. Africa & China, Cooperation for Sustainability, Briefing Note From World Wide Fund for Nature to
Competent Authorities in African Countries and China in the Context of
FOCAC (March 2012 World Wide Fund for Nature, formerly the World
Wildlife Fund) at 2. See also Moghadam, supra note 17, at 13-14 (detailing
that low-income countries’ primary exports to BRICs are resource-based
commodities).
36. Rising from $20 million per year in the early 1990s, Chinese FDI in Africa
jumped to close to $100 million in 2000, to $400 million by 2005, and
were more than $1 billion in 2006, a growth rate higher than Chinese FDI
in any other part of the world. Zafar, supra note 13.
37. Id.
38. Moghadam, supra note 17, at 18. It has been estimated that there are more
than 700 Chinese enterprises in more than 50 countries, employing close
to 80,000 Chinese workers in a broad variety of sectors, including light
manufacturing, services, agroprocessing, apparel, and telecommunications. 
Africa has also been on the receiving end of, inter alia, low-cost Chinese
motorcycles, electronic goods, and tee shirts. Zafar, supra note 13.
39. Just as investment is not confined to resource-rich nations, infrastructure
projects, unlike many earlier colonial projects, are not directly tied to mines
and oil wells. Brautigam, supra note 2, at 277-79. Joanne Wagner “Going
Out”: Is China’s Skillful Use of Soft Power in Sub-Saharan Africa a Threat to
U.S. Interests?, 64 NDU Press 99 (2012), available at http://www.ndu.edu/
press/lib/pdf/jfq-64/jfq-64_99-106_wagner.pdf.
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tial change in focus as resources and infrastructure became
unambiguous priorities.40 These sectors have been dominated by central and provincial State-Owned Enterprises
(SOEs), whose investments are larger and more costly than
most private projects.41 Large infrastructure and resourceextraction projects are structured quite differently from
traditional Western interventions.  Unfortunately, infrastructure has not been a central focus of Western development agencies as of late, which have instead concentrated
on free market reforms, good governance, human rights,
and other matters.42 Yet, African nations have very much
sought funding to construct infrastructure, and China, a
fellow developing country, also views it as a critical component of modernization. The parties have linked China’s
need for resources with Africa’s need for infrastructure
to fashion a mutually beneficial strategy.  Known as the
Angola model, infrastructure is acquired by African nations
through resource-based loan agreements that secure the
flow of natural resources to China in return for China
financing and constructing infrastructure projects.43 Chinese contractors are building roads, railroads, fiber optic
cables, and hydroelectric power dams, and developing
soft infrastructure projects, such as schools, hospitals, stadiums, and government office buildings.44 These projects
appear to be assisting ordinary people, irrespective of the
inclinations of their governments.45
40. Resources are important, but relations have been instituted with almost all
African countries, whether or not they are oil- or mineral-rich. The relationship between China and Africa is also more focused on mutual benefit, and
while Chinese companies definitely profit, China has been more willing
to focus on projects African countries desire. Brautigam, supra note 2, at
277-81.
41. Kaplinsky & Morris, supra note 20.
42. Beginning in the 1980s, the Washington Consensus began to dominate
development policy.  It proposed 10 policy prescriptions including, inter
alia, fiscal discipline, tax reform, reordering public expenditure priorities
away from subsidies, privatization and market deregulation, trade liberalization, and easing barriers to FDI. Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus:
How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the TwentyFirst Century 57 (Basic Books 2010); John E. Stiglitz, Globalization
and Its Discontents 59-61, 31-34 (2003). In the early post-colonial era,
infrastructure was a priority for development agencies. The shift began in
the 1970s, when the focus became basic needs, which was followed by a
series of other priorities, and accelerated with the advent of the Washington
Consensus, which stressed free-market reforms, good governance, and other
matters. Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 18, at 33-49.
43. Helmut Asche & Margot Schuller, Chinese Engagement in Africa—Opportunities and Risks for Development 36-37 (GTZ 2008);
Chris Alden & Ana Cristina Alves, China and Africa’s Natural Resources: The Challenges and Implications for Development and
Governance 9-10 (South African Inst. of International Affairs Occasional
Paper No.  41, Sept.  2009), http://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/
china-and-africa-s-natural-resources-the-challenges-and-implications-fordevelopment-and-governance.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012); Zafar, supra
note 13, at 120; Conrad et al., supra note 11 at 17-18.
44. Kouassi, supra note 28, at 6.C. For example, Chinese companies are mining
oil in Angola and Sudan, building roads in Ethiopia, are an active part of
the electricity sector in Kenya, building infrastructure and developing the
tourism industry in Sierra Leone, and servicing mobile phone networks in
Kenya and Nigeria. Throughout the entire Sub-Saharan continent, Chinese
companies are constructing much-needed infrastructure, including dams,
ports, and roads, and are helping to renovate government offices.  Zafar,
supra note 13, at 105.
45. Cooke, supra note 2 at, 39-41. “By the end of 2009 China finished more
than 500 infrastructure projects, including the completion of over 2000
km of railroads, more than 3000 kilometers of roads, 11 bridges, dozens of
hydropower stations and ports.” Huang Meibo & Ql Xie, Forum on China-
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Over time, a mind-numbing aggregate of conditions
were imposed to obtain International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and World Bank financing .46 By contrast, China
follows a policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs
of other states and does not encumber its investments
with conditions and requirements.47 Thus, while China
is not funding and propping up corrupt governments, it
also does not require good governance or the many other
conditions imposed by Western donors.  China contends
that strong and sustainable economic growth and social
stability will eventually result in good governance, the rule
of law, environmental protection, and the observance of
human rights; Western developers believe the reverse and
have made these requisites conditions for funding.48 Not
surprisingly, African governments prefer China’s approach,
and it may prompt Western funders to reassess their policies and tenets as Chinese loans and assistance open fresh
avenues of funding.
By providing additional financing options and outpacing
World Bank and IMF credit levels, China is undercutting
the overwhelming influence and domination these institutions have long exercised over African governments,49 and
the international community is not pleased with this turn
of events.50 Many concerns have been raised about China’s
role in Africa, including its negative influence on governance, human rights, local employment, labor conditions,
product quality, and the sustainability of the continent’s
debt burden.51 China is also charged with environmental
degradation and the depletion of finite natural resources.52
There is undoubtedly some merit to these claims.53
China’s need for natural resources has reinforced SSA’s
position as a supplier of natural resources for global
manufacturing, and in this respect, its FDI is no different than that of Western governments and corporations
both during and after the colonial era.54 Moreover, there
have been serious environmental problems with a number

46.
47.

48.
49.
50.

51.

52.
53.

54.

Africa Cooperation: Development and Prospects, FOCAC Fifth Ministerial
Meeting, supra note 26, at 10.
Kouassi, supra note 28, at 9-10.
The one consistent exception has been conditioning assistance on nonrecognition of Taiwan. Mario Esteban, Diplomatic Battle Between Beijing and
Taipei in Latin America and the Caribbean, 25 Chinese (Taiwan) Y.B. Int’l
L. & Aff. 65, 74-75 (2007).
Kouassi, supra note 28, at 6.
In 2006, China extended nearly three times the sums offered by these institutions. Alden, supra note 12.
For a critique of this discourse, see Barry Sautman & Yan Hairong, Trade,
Investment, Power and the China-in-Africa Discourse, Asia-Pacific J., 52-309, (Dec.  28, 2009), http://www.japanfocus.org/-Yan-Hairong/3278 (last
visited Oct. 24, 2012).
Western scholars and the media contend that China’s methodology is neocolonial because it discourages unions, creates limited job opportunities for
local African workers, and the few jobs that are sometimes generated are
low-skilled, low wage, and may involve unsafe working conditions. Bosshard, supra note 25, at 5.
Urban, supra note 14, at 12.
For example, assistance is tied and Chinese corporations rely on Chinese
workers, even if those workers live a much more Spartan existence than
Western aid workers, who are paid huge salaries. Brautigam, supra note 2,
at 157.
Bosshard, supra note 25, at 4. Kouassi, supra note 28, at 7 (noting that Africa needs a strategy if it is not to become a Sino-European battleground for
raw materials to fuel industry and markets for their manufactured goods).
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of Chinese investments in SSA, including projects undertaken by central and provincial SOEs. But there are also
several implicit assumptions at work in these assertions. 
First, Western critiques assume that Western interests are
more progressive and therefore better for Africans and poor
people in general.  Unfortunately, while post-Cold War55
Western governments may attempt to encourage policies
that endeavor to take the environment, human rights, and
other such concerns into account, Western-based multinational corporations are not as conscientious, especially
when it comes to oil and other extractive industries.56 Second, these appraisals and assessments assume that Western
commentators should and can influence, and even monitor, relations between other members of the international
community. This speaks to the status of poor and perhaps
particularly African nations in the global hierarchy; they
are deemed in need of our counsel and protection. Yet, it
is not apparent that China or African nations remain quite
as willing to accept Western prerogatives or guidance in
an era where funding is coming from non-Western sources
and the policies being pursued appear to be more effective
and in line with the needs and goals of African nations. 
Thus, as Western influence wanes, Chinese environmental
policies and strategies become ever more important if we
are to discern the environmental impact of China’s engagement with SSA.57

II.

Undesirable Environmental
Consequences

There are three possible sources that might determine the
environmental parameters of Chinese FDI: China’s domestic policies; the laws of the nation where investment takes
place; or international standards governing FDI. As countries industrialize, economic growth frequently takes priority over environmental regulation, and China’s experience
is no exception.58 While China is now focused on enacting
and implementing environmental laws and regulations,
the road has been difficult and success sometimes tenuous. China’s policies are not the most promising, which is
55. During the Cold War, such concerns were often secondary; they have now
been replaced by seeing the world through a national security post-9/11
lens, Halper, supra note 42, at 76-77.
56. See, e.g., James Vicini, U.S. Court to Hear Shell Nigeria Human Rights Case,
Reuters, Oct.  17 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/17/usroyaldutchshell-nigeria-lawsuit-idUSTRE79G42Z20111017 (last visited
Oct. 24, 2012); Terry Macalister, Shell Must Face Friends of the Earth Nigeria
Claim in Netherlands, The Guardian, Dec. 30, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/dec/30/shell-oruma-alleged-pollution-claim/ (last
visited Oct. 24, 2012).
57. While the policies of African nations are also important, a survey of such
policies would be monumental and are beyond the scope of this Article.
58. The environment was not an issue in most domestic systems or internationally until after the Second World War, despite the environmental havoc
sometimes wrought by the industrial revolution since the 18th century.
While international environmental management can be traced to early
19th century conservation treaties, the modern international environmental
movement is widely viewed as commencing in 1972 with the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm. See Declaration of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Environment Programme, available at http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503.
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reflected in some of the environmental problems and lack
of standards found in their foreign investment policies and
strategies. African nations generally have not complained
very much, nor have they vigorously pressed for greater
environmental protection.  While these nations may have
domestic environmental protection policies, the laws and
their enforcement may be weak and environmental concerns may be near the bottom of a long list of priorities. 
Finally, international environmental standards might be
utilized to govern investment in SSA, but Beijing generally
views them as proxies for Western policies. Although it has
been somewhat more receptive of late, China has resisted
incorporating them into its “going out” strategy, citing
its policy of non-interference.59 Yet, non-interference may
mean relying on weak national standards that governments
feel too weak to insist upon.

A.

China’s Domestic Environmental Paradigm

1.

Environmental Calamity

Beijing has made economic development and growth its
overriding priority and in the process neglected environmental standards, with negative consequences.60 China has
managed to lift millions out of poverty, but it lacks sufficient natural resources to sustain this growth.61 Resources
are being overutilized and as China’s economy continues to
expand at a rate of 10% or more each year, the demand for
natural resources—coal, oil, timber, natural gas, and potable water—will only intensify and place enormous pressures on ecological services.62 Current pollution levels are
severe and almost one-third of China’s territory is affected
by acid rain.63 In addition, coal is China’s primary source
59. China has a policy of noninterference and purports not to prescribe any
particular development model for other nations.  Cooke, supra note 2, at
32-33. On the other hand, such export is inevitable. Bosshard, supra note
25, at 14.
60. Roda Mushkat, Compliance With International Environmental Regimes: Chinese Lessons, 34 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 493, 494-95.
61. China has sustained an average annual growth of about 10% over the past
two decades, significantly increasing the standard of living for millions of its
citizens. It is the world’s largest nation, with an estimated population of 1.3
billion people. Yet, China has a relatively small area of cultivated land and
few water resources. Economic development has dramatically increased the
demand for energy and natural resources, such as water and land. China’s
natural resources are also among the most exploited and polluted in the
world. Beyer, supra note 15, at 187. For an exhaustive examination of the
environmental impact of modernization on China, see Cost of Pollution
in China Economic Estimates of Physical Damages, World Bank xii
(Rural Development, Natural Resources and Environment Management
Unit 2007), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resources/China_Cost_of_Pollution.pdf [hereinafter Cost of Pollution].
62. For instance, groundwater is so overexploited that it is placing severe stress
on lakes and other freshwater sources. Indeed, China faces water shortages,
water pollution, and flooding. In addition to raw sewage, modern toxic industrial waste and pesticide runoff from agricultural activities have worsened water pollution. Cost of Pollution, supra note 61, at xi-xvii.
63. Mushkat, supra note 60, at 496-97. Pollution levels in major Chinese cities
are among the highest on earth. Beyer, supra note 15, at 187. Srini Sitaraman, Regulating the Belching Dragon: Rule of Law, Politics of Enforcement,
and Pollution in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. &
Pol’y 267, 276 (2007).  Inadequately regulated industries and household
emissions generate water and air pollution.  More than 75% of the water
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of energy and it is now the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2), accounting for 14% of the total global
carbon output.64 Current projections indicate that China’s
reliance on coal could expand to 77% by 2020, which will
only aggravate worsening atmospheric pollution and accelerate the pace of global climate change.65

2.

Domestic Environmental Regulation66

As it has become increasingly apparent that growth at
any price has immense costs for public health, the environment, and ultimately the economy, Beijing has taken
steps to impose environmental regulations.67 Since the late
1970s, and particularly since 2004, wide-ranging domestic environmental regulations and policies addressing a
multitude of environmental issues have been enacted.68 A
provisional Environmental Protection Law (EPL) was promulgated in 1979, and updated in 1989,69 and the State
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) was
created in 1984.70 These efforts have continued with new

64.

65.
66.
67.
68.

69.

70.

supply in urban areas is unsuitable for drinking or fishing, while automobile
exhaust emissions produce dense urban smog. Sulfur dioxide (SO2) concentrations in one-half of the 88 Chinese cities monitored by the World Health
Organization (WHO) substantially exceeded WHO safety parameters. In
2003 alone, more than 21 tons of SO2 were discharged into the atmosphere,
up nearly 12% from the previous year. Air pollution costs $25 billion annually in health care costs and lost work hours. Sitaraman, supra. Acid rain
endangers forests, crop growth, and aquatic life. Recent estimates suggest
that direct economic losses resulting from acid rain pollution are about US
$13.3 billion. Id.
China is both the largest producer and consumer of coal, accounting for
more than one-quarter of the total global coal consumption. Coal’s share of
its energy mix is decreasing (72.2 % in 1980, to 69.4% in 2007). China’s
Policies and Action for Addressing Climate Change (Information Office of
the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (October 2008) at 27. 
See Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate
Change (2008), available at http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/File419.pdf [hereinafter Policies and Actions]. But of course,
in that same 25 years, production has grown and thus emissions remain
extraordinarily high. Moreover, China has 114 billion tons of proven coal
reserves.
Sitaraman, supra note 63, at 278.
The breadth and scope of China’s efforts and failures to confront the alarming environmental destruction wrought by modernization are beyond the
scope of this Article.
Bosshard, supra note 25, at 14. The World Bank has documented the alarming price China pays for its air and water pollution. Id. See generally Cost
of Pollution, supra note 61.
Sitaraman, supra note 63, at 295. Between 1979 and 2004, Beijing passed
59 major environmental laws, focusing on such issues as wildlife preservation, conserving endangered species, addressing air and water quality, and
preventing soil erosion, desertification, and atmospheric and marine pollution. China also promulgated administrative decrees regarding land administration, city planning, energy conservation, electric power regulations,
protecting cultural relics, urban reforestation, promoting clean production,
and protecting aquatic resources. Id.
The 1979 Environmental Protection Law was significantly revised and
amended by 1989.  Xin Qiu & Honglin Li, China’s Environmental Super
Ministry Reform: Background, Challenges, and the Future 39 ELR 10152,
10153 (Feb.  2009).  The statute encompasses a broad variety of environmental issues and furnishes basic principles for preventive and rehabilitative
measures.  It also includes regulatory measures addressing water, air, solid
waste, and noise pollution, and a system for environmental management,
monitoring, liability, and enforcement, and is considered a watershed in the
evolution of the statutory response to the ecological challenge.  Mushkat,
supra note 60, at 521.
Qiu & Li, supra note 69, at 10153. In March 2008, the Chinese National
People’s Congress elevated the former State Environmental Protection Ad-
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environmental commitments covering energy intensity,
pollution, water, forests,71 and more general policies, such
as prevention,72 environmental impact assessments,73 and
land use planning.74 The Green Credit Policy75 and other
measures adopted by SEPA have promoted compliance by
domestic polluters.76
Still, China’s environmental regime has faced implementation difficulties, due to deficiencies in the laws
themselves,77 staffing and technical shortcomings,78 and
the urgency still accorded to economic development.79
Moreover, national laws are made by SEPA, but often
enforced by Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs)
whose allegiance is to local governments with few incentives to impose environmental laws they often view as
inimical to their economic interests.80 Local governments
ministration to the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Id.
71. Nagle, supra note 28, at 614. China banned the logging of old growth forests in 1998 and strengthened water laws in 2002. Bosshard, supra note 25,
at 14.
72. The “prevention first policy” emphasizes preventive measures to manage and
mitigate the negative effects on natural resources and to realize sustainable
development by linking environmental protection and economic development. Beyer, supra note 15.
73. Environmental impact assessments were mandated in 2003 for a range of
projects, and the law was updated in 2006 to require public participation. 
Bosshard, supra note 25, at 14-15.
74. Beyer, supra note 15, at 203. China is attempting to integrate environmental
protection into designs and strategies to construct cities, towns, and villages
and to plan industrial, infrastructure, and agricultural projects. Incorporating environmental protection measures from the outset is also part of the
“prevention first policy.” See also Edward H. Ziegler, China’s Cities, Globalization, and Sustainable Development: Comparative Thoughts on Urban Planning, Energy, and Environmental Policy, 5 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev.
295 (2006).
75. The Green Credit policy obliges Chinese banks and financial institutions
“to provide low-interest loan rates to businesses that develop pollution control facilities, engage in ecological protection through the development of
energy conservation mechanisms, green manufacturing, eco-agriculture,
and similar initiatives. Credit may be denied to companies with poor environmental records.” Thus, credit is linked to corporate environmental
performance in an effort to strengthen the enforcement of environmental
laws. Kate Swartz & Guan Linal, Taming the Dragon: How Corporations in
China Can Be Employed to Further Environmental Risk Management, 13 Vt. 
J. Envtl. L. 97, 98, 110 (2011). In August 2007, SEPA confirmed an earlier
decision to inspect companies in polluting sectors—including coal, petroleum, thermal power, chemicals, and textiles—as a condition for approving
their stock listing. In October 2007, SEPA and the Ministry of Commerce
announced they would ban companies from exporting for up to three years
if they were found to seriously violate environmental rules. Bosshard, supra
note 25, at 13.
76. Beijing has indicated that it strongly supports more stringent environmental
regulations and has incorporated environmental protection and other ecological considerations in recent Five Year Plans. Bosshard, supra note 25, at
15.
77. Chinese laws can be general, vague, and include aspirational language that
encourages rather than requires specific activities. When duties are imposed,
procedures and specific goals may be lacking. Mushkat, supra note 60, at
524.
78. Besides a lack of staff, financial resources, and technical expertise, SEPA
poorly coordinates with other administrative agencies as well as its own subordinate agencies. As a result, SEPA often is unaware of local developments,
thus limiting its capacity to implement national laws, which leaves enforcement to local officials. Mushkat, supra note 60, at 525-30.
79. Beyer, supra note 15, at 205-07. Nagle, supra note 28, at 621.
80. Although China is a centralized state, it is also divided into provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities that are under the control of the central government.  Legislation and directives emanate from Beijing and are
followed by subnational governmental units. In practice, however, this high
degree of administrative cohesion may not exist as China becomes increasingly decentralized and functions are shared by the central government and
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sponsor or own industries and compete with other entities
to attract business and commerce.81 Most regard environmental regulations as incompatible with economic growth
and thus seek to undermine them.82 Moreover, local governments may also own and control entities that invest
abroad, including in SSA.

B.

African Policies: Impact and Pushback

Historically, the most lucrative FDI in SSA has been environmentally sensitive, so foreign investment has often
come at a high environmental cost.  A significant part of
Chinese FDI entails oil and mineral resource extraction,
which are environmentally problematic sectors.83 Thus, to
the extent that China is investing in extractive industries,
it is replicating previous Western FDI in environmental
terms. Moreover, China often goes where westerners have
not bothered to tarry, which may raise additional environmental concerns.84 There are also fears that as environmental regulation increases at home, Chinese companies
with poor environmental track records may be tempted to
invest in nations with weak regulatory regimes, such as the
nations of SSA.85
Pressure from African governments for stronger environmental regulation has perhaps not been strong enough. 
To the extent that there are misgivings about aspects of

81.

82.

83.

84.

85.

local institutions. EPBs are responsible for environmental protection within
their jurisdiction and have wide discretion in addressing environmental
concerns. But they are funded, controlled, and under the direction of local
entities that themselves have considerable power, discretion, and autonomy. 
Beyer, supra note 15, at 188-90.  EPBs answer to local governments and
SEPA, yet SEPA supervision is nominal, while EPBs are part of local governments. Their budgets are funded by local governments that themselves may
have special connections to local industries. Beyer, supra note 15, at 207. 
Predictably, China has had difficulties enforcing environmental regulations
adopted by the central government. Nagle, supra note 28, at 623.
Local governments have considerable administrative and fiscal autonomy,
which has generated considerable pressure to attract and promote commerce and to build local economies.  They often sponsor or own industries and consider environmental regulations incompatible with economic
growth. Beyer, supra note 15, at 189. EPBs frequently evade and circumvent national policies and environmental laws because of local economic
considerations and, at times, corruption. EPBs must enforce SEPA policies
without disrupting industrial output, employment creation, or economic
growth. Sitaraman, supra note 63, at 311.
National policies may beget local countermeasures to evade and exploit
loopholes in national laws. Local governments and EPBs have colluded to
help polluters evade or circumvent environmental regulations; waived pollution discharge fines; and suppressed reports documenting the poor environmental performance of local industries. Sitaraman, supra note 63, at
309, 311.
Astrid B. Akoyoko, Africa, China, and the “Green” Factor, Consultancy Africa Intelligence (Nov. 2011) http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=899:africa-china-and-thegreen-factor-&catid=58:asia-dimension-discussion-papers&Itemid=264
(last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
For example, in Gabon, Sinopec, a Chinese company, explored for oil in
Loango National Park until the National Park Service ordered exploration
to stop in September 2006. Conservation groups noted that oil exploration
in Loango threatened rare plants and animals, and that the environmental
impact study had not been approved by the environment ministry. In January 2008, Sierra Leone banned timber exports because Chinese and other
logging companies were plundering forests and not respecting the law.
For instance, after old growth logging was banned in 1998, Chinese timber
companies quickly moved abroad, and China soon became the world’s largest timber importer. Bosshard, supra note 25, at 15.
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Chinese investment policies, they have tended to focus on
other concerns.86 Some projects have been environmentally
problematic, however, with several resulting in local protests, and in some countries, the government has required
stronger environmental due diligence.87 For its part, the
African Union has called for adherence to environmental
regulations in Chinese projects.88 But the general tendency
has been to welcome China’s growing presence, the economic boost it is generating, and its pragmatic and rapid
method of establishing aid projects irrespective of conditions concerning corruption, good governance, or environmental impact.89 African governments can and should
insist on better environmental standards, for ultimately it
is they who are responsible for the environmental stewardship of their nations.90 It may also be that they are beginning to do so.

C.

International Standards

“Since the 1980s, multilateral development banks have
adopted policies that address the social and environmental effects of their projects.”91 In December 2001, the
export credit agencies of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted Common Approaches to the Environment, establishing joint
environmental guidelines, whereby “export credit agencies have committed to evaluating projects against country
standards, one or more relevant environmental standards
and guidelines published by the World Bank or other
multilateral development banks.”92 China is not a member of the OECD, however, and the China Export-Import
Bank (China Exim Bank) has refused to join the Common
Approaches initiative. International and Western financial
institutions worry that Chinese banks will fund projects
Western institutions have rejected as presenting intolerable
environmental risks, and there is at least anecdotal evidence that borrowing governments are using the availability of Chinese funding to pressure Western financiers to
weaken or ignore environmental standards.93 There are also
86. Chinese projects have been charged with devastating local textile (and other) industries and criticized for preferring Chinese over African workers, or
not complying with local labor laws. Id.
87. Cooke, supra note 2, at 42-43.
88. In September 2006, an African Union task force urged all participants to
ensure that China gives more attention to protecting the environment in its
investment practices. Bosshard, supra note 25, at 9.
89. Maxwell M.  Mikwerzalamba, Foreword, The Bulletin of Fridays of the
Commission African Union Commission 5-6 (Jan. 2010). Bosshard, supra
note 25, at 8. Akoyoko, supra note 83, at 2 (critiquing the lack of regulation
in SSA countries).
90. Akoyoko, supra note 83, at 2.
91. Bosshard, supra note 25, at 9.
92. Id.
93. The Merowe Dam in Sudan is a case in point. Canada, Malaysia, European
and Arab countries refused to fund the project. Bosshard, supra note 25, at
6, 9. China has also been criticized more directly. The president of the European Investment Bank (EIB) noted that, “the competition of the Chinese
banks is clear. They don’t bother about social or human rights conditions. 
The Chinese snatched projects from under the Bank’s nose in Africa and
Asia, after offering to undercut EIB conditions on labor standards and the
environment.” Id. at 10.
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fears of a race to the bottom regarding the environmental
standards employed by IFIs.94
The Chinese government has rejected criticism of its
environmental record in Africa.  In response to World
Bank accusations that it was undermining environmental
standards, Chinese officials insisted that its foreign relations entail non-interference in the internal affairs of other
nations, and just as China does not accept other countries
imposing their values, social systems, or ideologies upon
China, it will not impose its system upon others.95 Indeed,
China regards international standards as Western standards, which they do not consider binding.96 Nonetheless,
intergovernmental organizations   and nongovernmental
organizations have continued to pressure Beijing to accede
to international standards, and their efforts have yielded a
few modest concessions.97

D.

Compromise and a Modicum of Convergence

Non-interference notwithstanding, ignoring workers’ and
human rights, displacing populations, and causing environmental destruction can lead to instability, and instability is not good for business. After difficulties in several
countries, Beijing became increasingly aware that the environmental damage caused by Chinese ventures could have
undesirable repercussions.98 Strategies adopted by the State
Council, the Ministry of Commerce, China Exim Bank,
and other agencies suggest increasing sensitivity to the
environmental footprint of Chinese companies abroad.99
94. Bosshard, supra note 25, at 10.  The head of the EIB recommended that
international financial institutions (IFIs) lower their standards in response
to Chinese competition, arguing that IFIs should avoid excessive conditions
and had to think about the degree of conditionality they impose.
95. Bosshard, supra note 25.
96. I think this is basically accurate. Western interests have systematically dominated the international institutions they created and have consistently and
steadfastly ignored the views of Southern states, especially the poorest nations. What masquerades as international is often Western, as a reluctant
South is ignored or forced to go along. See generally Gordon, supra note 19. 
Of course, with truly international environmental problems such as ozone
depletion and climate change, this equation has shifted. Ruth Gordon, Climate Change and the Poorest Nations: Further Reflections on Global Inequality,
78 Colo. L. Rev. 1559, 1600-09 (2007).
97. Bosshard, supra note 25, at 10. Despite China’s refusal to accede to OECD
guidelines, the OECD published its first Environmental Performance Review in 2007 and formulated recommendations for adjustments. It argued
for stronger governmental efforts to ensure that Chinese corporations operating overseas, particularly in such environmentally sensitive industries as
forest products and mining, are part of China’s professed goal of an international reputation for sound environmental management and sustainable
development. It recommended improved government oversight and environmental performance in the overseas operations of Chinese corporations.
98. Bosshard, supra note 25, at 11. Cheng Siwei, a leading member of the People’s Congress warned that “irresponsible practices” had prevented Chinese
companies from expanding overseas and predicted that even in developing
countries, foreign companies that turn a blind eye to their social responsibilities will be kicked out of the market. President Jintao repeatedly urged
Chinese businesses to respect local laws during his February 2007 visit to
Africa. Id.
99. In October 2006, the State Council issued nine principles to regulate foreign investments by Chinese companies. They included attending to environmental protection. Bosshard, supra note 25, at 12. China established the
China Export Import Bank in 1994 to promote Chinese exports; it reports
directly to the State Council, although the goal is to eventually transform
the bank into a commercial institution. Brautigam, supra note 2, at 79-80. 
The bank is more than the administrative arm of China’s export promo-
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A series of project guidelines cover such themes as workers’ rights, product safety, community relations, and environmental impact assessments.  Concessional loans from
China Exim Bank are an integral part of official development assistance, and the bank often finances large government-owned projects.100 China Exim Bank policies are an
important indicator of broader government policies, and
the bank has adopted requirements that incorporate Chinese norms, but first and foremost hinge on host country standards.101 Moreover, while China Exim Bank does
not recognize a legal or political obligation to support or
accede to standards drafted by international bodies,102 it
has signed two memoranda of understanding with the
World Bank and the International Finance Corporation
to cooperate on African energy and transport projects.103
While these obligations are not mandatory, it does indicate
the political intentions of the Chinese government, at least
with respect to large projects undertaken by governmentowned and financed entities.104
Accordingly, it seems local laws will be the most salient
in these projects.  That said, there are also strong indications that all parties are more interested in taking environmental costs into account. Infrastructure and extractive
ventures are largely within the purview of Chinese government-owned corporations and are financed by the China
Exim Bank.105 Thus, these entities can more easily incortion, however, and enjoys relative autonomy in its project evaluation and
approval processes. It provides export credits to Chinese and foreign companies; foreign government loans for projects in China; offers foreign exchange
guarantees; and administers the Chinese government’s concessional loans to
foreign governments. For an extended discussion of Chinese institutions for
development, see Asche, supra note 43, at 32-35.
100. Ninety percent of China Exim Bank export credits go to SOEs and to large
projects (of more than 100 million renminbi (RMB) each). As part of China’s “going global strategy,” China Exim Bank offers strategic overseas investors an interest rate discount. At the end of 2007, the outstanding loans on
China Exim Bank’s balance sheet amounted to RMB 321 billion. Bosshard,
supra note 25, at 3.
101. Bosshard, supra note 25, at 12. The policy also stipulates an active role for
China Exim Bank in monitoring environmental impacts throughout the
project cycle and reserves the right to cancel a loan if environmental effects
are not adequately addressed.  According to the OECD, Chinese officials
will discuss changes in project-related governance to ensure loan repayment,
but it is not entirely clear if financiers also apply this assertiveness to the
social and environmental appraisal of projects. Id.
102. In September 2005, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce suggested that the
OECD and China cooperate on issues of corporate social responsibility and
that the OECD further explain its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
to Chinese companies. Bosshard, supra note 25, at 12.
103. Bosshard, supra note 25, at 13.  Under these Memoranda of Understanding, financial institutions will cooperate in World Bank African energy and
transport projects, IFC equity investments, and advisory services on environmental issues.
104. Control over the numerous provincial, municipal, and private Chinese enterprises that establish businesses , export goods, or invest in SSA, however,
may be more limitedb and thus some Chinese ventures may contradict government appeals for improved corporate social responsibility. Bosshard, supra note 25, at 13. See generally Simon Zadek et al., Responsible Business
in Africa: Chinese Business Leaders’ Perspectives, available at http://
www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_54_zadeketal.pdf.
105. Kaplinsky & Morris, supra note 20, at 554-55. The Chinese Development
Bank (CDB), one of China’s policy banks, is also becoming increasingly
involved in financing overseas energy projects, including in SSA.  Kristen
McDonald et al., Exporting Dams: China’s Hydropower Industry Goes Global,
90 J. Envtl. Mgmt. S294, S297 (2009).
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porate environmentally friendly mechanisms into their
corporate policies and strategies, which is the course the
central government is attempting to take at home. Projects
can be structured in an environmentally responsible versus
irresponsible manner as a matter of government policy, and
if environmental impact statements are a standard part of
corporate policy at home, they can be standard operating
procedure abroad.  This should square with China’s policy of non-interference, as all enterprises would routinely
employ these procedures across the board.
There have been environmental problems and protests
by local communities, as well as calls for more observance
of environmental standards.  Therefore, it seems highly
unlikely that governments would resist additional environmental protection, especially if it is built into projects
and is an integral part of corporate policy.  Like human
beings everywhere, African peoples and their governments
would prefer cleaner water and air, the preservation of
natural resources, and the other benefits of a sustainable
environment. It is one thing not to insist on environmental
safeguards if to do so might put nations at a competitive
disadvantage for FDI and funding.  It would seem to be
a win-win situation, however, when the investor is ready,
willing, and able to invest in a more environmentally favorable manner and there is little or no risk of losing out to
nations that do not insist on high environmental standards. Poor countries are highly unlikely to resist, and at
least central SOEs can afford to take this important step.

III. Potential Constructive Consequences:
Linking China’s Green Leap Forward to
Africa’s Need for Energy
As China begins implementing environmental policies to
clean up its water, air, and soil, it is also taking account
of the implications of climate change, a global problem to
which it is now the world’s largest contributor.106 Beijing is
cognizant of the nation’s vulnerability to the consequences
of climate change and thus has a stake in reducing GHG
emissions domestically and internationally, even if thus
far it has been a laggard in global efforts to address this
quandary.107 As China attempts to improve energy efficiency at home, it also plans to export these technologies
and is positioning itself to become an international leader
106. To sustain its precipitous economic growth, China must adjust its economic
model and shift from labor-intensive manufacturing to fostering innovation
and producing globally competitive goods; green technology has become a
critical aspect of efforts to accomplish this conversion. As China confronts
climate change at home and abroad, it is becoming the model for developing and investing in renewable energy and low-carbon ventures. Akoyoko,
supra note 83.
107. Charles R. McElwee, Featured Guest, Economist Debates (Nov. 25, 2009),
http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/421 (last visited Oct.  24,
2012).  Unfortunately, China has provided more leadership on climate
change than the second largest emitter, the United States, which has been
unable to cure its addiction to oil and is unlikely to be a leader in this sphere
in the immediate future. Nevertheless, as the leader of the developing country negotiating block, China has continued to demand significant carbon
reductions, financial assistance, and technology transfers from industrialized
countries.
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in renewable energy and a more sustainable development
that encompasses “green growth that will hopefully create greener economies.”108 This “green leap forward” could
dovetail with the needs of SSA, an area also attempting
to modernize and a region in dire need of modern energy. 
Renewable energy solutions could play a significant role in
avoiding future emissions and preventing carbon lock-in,
which is costly to reverse.109 China appears ready, willing,
and able to provide the necessary funding and technology
to bring these possibilities to SSA.

A.

Africa’s Energy Needs

1.

The Energy Deficit

While China is the largest emitter of GHGs, Africa’s
contribution to climate change is negligible, accounting
for only 2.5% of global GHG emissions.110 This is largely
because SSA has the world’s lowest rate of access to modern
energy111; only about one-quarter of its 800 million inhabitants have electricity.112 In total, Africa’s generating capability is 47 gigawatts (GW) of electricity,113 which is less
108. The OECD has defined green growth as “promoting economic growth while
reducing pollution and GHG emissions, minimizing waste and inefficient
use of natural resources, and maintaining biodiversity.” The U.N. Economic
Commission for Africa defines a “green economy” as “enabling economic
growth and human development without exposing future generations to
significant environmental risks and ecological scarcities while creating new
opportunities for green growth and employment creation.” Akoyoko, supra
note 83 at 1, citing Investment for Green Growth, OECD, http://www.oecd.
org. A 2008 Chinese White Paper, Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate
Change, committed to working toward global sustainable development with
other countries. McElwee, supra note 107; Policies and Actions , supra
note 64, at 46-50.Guidelines adopted by the State Council, the Ministry of
Commerce, China Exim Bank, and other agencies also suggest that China
intends to address the environmental footprint of Chinese FDI.
109. Yong Chen, Sustainable Energy for Equitable Development 3 (Bank
Information Centre, WB Group Apr. 2010), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTESC/Resources/BIC_Contribution_to_WBG_Energy_Strategy_ReviewFINAL_April23_2010.pdf.
110. Conrad et al., supra note 11, at 24-25. Net emissions from deforestation,
however, are a problem that renewable energy solutions could help mitigate. 
Id. The Clean Development Mechanism funds projects to reduce GHG
emissions in non-Annex 1 or developing countries. Gordon, supra note 96,
at 1608-11. In 2008, total CO2 emissions from the African continent were
approximately 600 million tons, less than German emissions of 800 million
tons. Most SSA emissions reductions are from South Africa, which is the
only country emitting significant amounts of GHGs. Id.
111. World Wildlife Fund, China and Renewable Energy in Africa: Opportunities for Norway? 14 (Mar.  2012), available at http://awsassets.
wwf.no/downloads/china_and_renewable_energy_in_africa_opportunities_for_norway.pdf [hereinafter World Wildlife Fund]. Unless significant
changes are made in policies and the pace of investments, more people in
SSA will be without energy services in 2030 than today, given projected
rates of population growth. Chen, supra note 109, at 2.
112. Roula Yazigi, Africa’s Development in a Changing Climate, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 10
(2009), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2010/
Resources/5287678-1252586925350/Africa-WDR-2010-booklet.pdf.
113. Electricity is measured in watts.  Watts are very small units, so the terms
kilowatt (kW), megawatt (MW), and gigawatt (GW) are employed. One
kW equals 1,000 watts. One MW equals 1,000 kW or one million watts. 
One GW equals 1,000 MW or 1 million kW or 1 billion watts. To put
this in context, one MW typically powers 1,000 households at any given
moment in time, roughly speaking.  MW and more particularly GW are
most commonly used to describe the capacity of generating units like wind
turbines or other power plants. The entire power-generation capacity of the
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than 0.6% of the global total and the equivalent of Norway’s total output.114 Thus, the need is great and the consequences of this insufficiency are profound.115 Remedying
the region’s dearth of adequate supplies of electricity will
require an estimated 93 billion dollars.116 Africa’s electricity-generating capacity is expected to triple by 2030, with
more than 200 GW of new capacity117; an important question for all of us is the means by which this electricity will
be generated.

2.

Energy Realities and Possibilities

Currently, small-scale biomass118 provides one-half of SSA’s
energy.119 In some nations, it accounts for up to 70-80%
of total energy consumption,120 and thus many countries
continent of Africa currently stands at 124 GW, of which only 30 GW is in
SSA (excluding South Africa).
114. Creamer Media Reporter, Africa’s Energy Problems Threatens Growth, Says
Nepad CEO, Engineering News (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/africas-energy-problems-threatens-growth-says-nepad-ceo-2009-11-12 (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). Norway currently has a
production capacity of 30 GW, but its population is only 5 million people,
compared to SSA’s 650 million (excluding South Africa’s population of 50
million). Seventy percent of Africans lack access to electricity, and the 30%
of Africans with access to electricity pay $20 billion per year for low-quality,
fuel-based lighting.  Energy Sector Management Assistant Program,
Meeting Africa’s Energy Needs and Widening Access to Sustainable
Energy in Sub-Sahara Africa 5 (May 2012), available at http://www.
esmap.org/esmap/sites/esmap.org/files/AFREAIntro_Brochure.pdf.
115. The paucity of modern energy services and technologies has wide-ranging
consequences.
Lack of access to electricity means no refrigeration for medicines
or food, limits on what type of businesses can be developed, as well
as any effective lighting.  As a result, children cannot easily study
in the evenings. Most Africans, even in urban areas, still use firewood, crop residues or charcoal for cooking and cook on inefficient
stoves, resulting in a high incidence of respiratory diseases because
of smoke. Many women and girls have to spend hours collecting
firewood, and cutting trees contributes to deforestation.
Meeting Africa’s Energy Needs: Costs and Benefits of
Hydropower, World Wildlife Fund 8 (2010), available at
http://tinyurl.com/WWFhydropower06.
116. Christian K.M.  Kingombe, Mapping the New Infrastructure Financing
Landscape, Overseas Development Institute 5 (Apr.  2011), available at
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/6311.pdf.  Its infrastructure needs
are in the range of $250 billion over the next 10 years. Id. at 2. To meet
demand and keep pace with projected growth, the energy sector in Africa
has to install approximately 7,000 MW of new generation capacity each
year. Jade Davenport, Sub-Saharan Africa Needs to Spend $41bn/y to Meet
Power Needs, Engineering News (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/sub-saharan-africa-needs-to-spend-41bny-to-meetpower-needs-2011-03-14 (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). SSA’s energy sector
needs an investment of $41 billion each year, approximately 6.4% of the
region’s gross domestic product, to address the region’s significant shortfall
in electricity supply.
117. Meeting Africa’s Energy Needs, supra note 115.
118. Id. at 8.
119. Randall Spalding-Fletcher, The Clean Development Mechanism: Energy Projects for Africa, Energy & Dev. Research Ctr. 64 (2010). South Africa produces 52% of Africa’s electricity. Total African generating capacity excluding
South Africa is only one-twentieth of Europe. Meeting Africa’s Energy
Needs, supra note 115.
120. In some rural areas, the figure can be as high as 90-100%, where energy generally consists of gathering wood from nearby woods and whatever sources
are available; this can also result in deforestation. Africa’s Renewable Energy
Future, FOCAC (May 2012), available at http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/
t822360.htm. “Biomass is biological material derived from living, or recently living organisms.” Biomass for energy usually refers to ‘plant-based material,” but can also pertain to animal- and vegetable-derived material. Basic
categories of materials include virgin wood and its byproducts; agricultural
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have devised regional or national bio-energy programs. 
There is also largely untapped commercial energy—including hydropower, oil, and gas, which are significant, but
unevenly distributed.121
With the exception of large hydropower, renewable
energy sources remain underutilized due to a lack of
financing and expertise.122 Yet, SSA possesses immense
potential for solar, wind, and in some regions, geothermal
energy.123 For example, solar thermal appliances have a distinct role in the African market, and solar water heaters
suggest a particularly promising alternative to the ubiquitous practice of burning wood and charcoal for fuel, and
could reduce deforestation, which would also reduce Africa’s modest contribution to climate change.124 Renewable
energy use is often limited to remote off-grid applications,
and thus there has been some progress regarding solar
home systems, household- and facility-scale biogas digesters, improved cook stove projects, and LED lanterns.
Substantial stretches of SSA have year-round sunlight125
and tropical zones enjoy a vast potential for solar photovoltaic (PV) electricity.126 Six hundred million people could
have electricity based on PV potential alone, yet Africa only
accounts for 15 megawatts (MW) of the world’s 15 GW of
total installed global solar PV capacity.127 There is also significant potential for wind power, although as of 2009, the
continent produced less than 600 MW of installed wind
capacity, mostly in East Africa, where Ethiopia, Kenya,
Tanzania, and others were planning or are currently utilizing this resource.128 Geothermal energy uses the earth’s
heat as an energy source129; its use in SSA is also concenresidues (from harvesting or processing); food waste (including from food
and “drink manufacturing, preparation and processing, and post-consumer
waste”); and industrial waste and co-products (from manufacturing and industrial processes). Biomass Energy Centre, What Is Biomass? http://www.
biomassenergycentre.org.uk/portal/page?_pageid=76,15049&_dad=portal
(last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
121. Rising commodity prices may make coal and oil too costly over the long
term. Kingombe, supra note 116.
122. Yazigi, supra note 112.
123. According to the World Wildlife Federation, Africa’ potential is second only
to Asia’s for generating energy from renewable sources. Their study estimates
that Africa could produce 42,000 terawatt/hours (TWh) (i.e., 42 trillion
KWh) annually from renewable energy sources by 2050.  World Wildlife
Fund, supra note 111, at 15.
124. Conrad et al., supra note 11.
125. In most parts of the continent, this amounts to an average irradiation of
about 2,200 kWh/m2/yr. Africa’s Renewable Energy Future, supra note 120.
126. Six hundred million people could be served with electricity based on its PV
potential. Ira Flatow, Could Africa Leapfrog the U.S. in Solar Power?, Science
Friday, June 6, 2008, http://www.sciencefriday.com/blogs/06/06/2008/
could-africa-leapfrog-the-u-s-in-solar-power.html (last visited Oct.  24,
2012).
127. Africa’s Renewable Energy Future, supra note 120. At the end of 2011, total
global solar PV capacity had grown to 67,400 MW, representing 0.5% of
worldwide electricity demand.  The total power output of the world’s PV
capacity is equal to 80 billion kWh of electricity over one calendar year.
128. Wind energy development has been rather limited in SSA, with only a few
nations, mostly in coastal areas, making extensive use of this technology. 
Africa’s Renewable Energy Future, supra note 120.
129. Geothermal energy uses heat from the earth as an energy source. It can be
used in a variety of ways, from powering large power stations to fueling
small pumping systems.  It can be found all over the world and is being
tapped in more than 24 countries as an “affordable and sustainable solution
to reducing dependence on fossil fuels.” Union of Concerned Scientists,
How Geothermal Energy Works, http: //www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/
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trated in East Africa, where it represents 4% of East African power, totaling approximately 10,000 MW.130 Other
African countries are also committing to making renewable energy a priority.131 For example, although Egypt,
Morocco, and Tunisia in North Africa are currently the
only African countries with wind farms of more than a
few MW, projects in Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, and
Tanzania are on the drawing board.132

3.

Hydropower

Whereas other forms of renewable energy still play a much
lesser role,133 large hydropower is currently the dominant
component of SSA’s energy mix,134 and there is still abundant potential beyond current usage levels.135 SSA has
290 GW of economically feasible hydropower capacity, of
which only 8% has been developed.136 Accordingly, large
and small hydropower projects are expected to expand current capacities in a number of countries.  This is also an
arena where China has focused both at home and abroad.137
Hydroelectric power has many positives that are only
mounting in the age of climate change.  Rather than
exploiting climate-damaging fossil fuels, such as coal,
hydroelectric power relies on water, a renewable resource,
to create electricity.138 Yet, to ensure a continuous, dependour-energy-choices/renewable-energy/how-geothermal-energy-works.html
(last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
130. Kenya and Ethiopia rely upon 10,000 MW of geothermal power, accounting for about 4% of East Africa’s power. Africa’s Renewable Energy Future,
supra note 120.
131. Africa’s Renewable Energy Future, supra note 120.  At the September 2011
African Energy Ministers’ meeting, increasing Africa’s renewable energy capacity was at the top of the agenda. World Wildlife Fund, supra note
111, at 15.
132. World Wildlife Fund, supra note 111, at 10.
133. Id. at 12. The energy market in SSA can be divided into large hydropower
versus other forms of renewable energy, and South Africa, an industrialized
country, versus the other nations on the continent. Outside of large hydropower, however, renewable energy use is mostly limited to remote off-grid
applications, such as solar home systems and facility-scale biogas digesters.
134. “Twenty two of Africa’s 47 countries generate more than 50% of their power
from hydropower, and for eight countries, it is more than 90%.” World
Wildlife Fund, supra note 111, at 12.
135. World Wildlife Fund, supra note 111, at 15. Africa’s water resources account for 10% of the world’s total (1,100 TWh), but its water utilization
rate is only 8%—approximately 93 TWh. Africa’s Renewable Energy Future,
supra note 120.
136. Meeting Africa’s Energy Needs, supra note 115. The entire installed generation capacity of 48 SSA countries is 68 GW, which is about the same as
the generation capacity of Spain. Davenport, supra note 116.
137. SSA is expected to establish additional hydropower generation capacity of
at least 20,165 MW by 2014 and yet currently, only 8% of Africa’s hydropower potential has been developed. Moreover, medium-scale hydropower
development is increasing, with more than one dozen countries having
20-60 MW hydropower plants, and even some recent Clean Development
Mechanism projects approved for medium-scale projects. China is financing
10 major hydropower projects with a combined capacity of 6,000 MW that
will increase SSA’s total hydropower generation capacity by 30%.  Alden,
supra note 43, at 17.
138. See Karlie Shea Clemons, Hydroelectric Dams: Transboundary Environmental
Effects and International Law, 36 Fla.  St.  U.  L.  Rev. 487, 490 (discussing hydropower as a renewable resource). Hydroelectric power is created by
moving water that turns the blades of a turbine, which then turns the rotor
of a generator that converts the energy created by the turbine into electricity. 
See U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), Hydroelectric Power: Managing
Water in the West (July 2005), available at http://www.usbr.gov/power/edu/
pamphlet.pdf.
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able source of energy, hydropower requires damming rivers,
streams, and canals to channel water from higher to lower
elevations, allowing it to reach a velocity that turns turbine blades to produce electricity.139 As would be expected,
larger dams generate more electricity at a lower cost than
smaller dams.140 Moreover, while the initial cost of constructing dams is rather high, the actual cost of generating
electricity is inexpensive, and energy produced by hydroelectric dams is more reliable and predictable than other
renewable sources, such as wind and solar.141
Historically, dams were favored by both the North and
South as a means to create sustainable, renewable hydroelectric power142 They are found throughout the industrialized world and have been financed by IFIs such as the
World Bank for over 50 years.143 At its peak, the World
Bank loaned approximately $2 billion annually to construct
enormous hydropower projects.144 Dams can buttress flood
control on rivers that are prone to flooding,145 create jobs
and sometimes tourism, and increase irrigation for agriculture.146 But dams can also have negative environmental
and societal drawbacks.  Dams can negatively affect river
ecosystems and cause flooding that destroys agricultural
acreage.147 They can disrupt river habitats, displace naturally flowing sediment, and create stagnant reservoirs that
facilitate the growth and spread of water-borne diseases
like malaria.148 Just as disquieting, hydroelectric dams can
significantly and adversely affect populations living within
139. See U.S. DOI, supra note 138.
140. See id. Currently, there are approximately 45,000 large dams in the world,
representing 16% of the world’s energy production. See Clemons, supra note
138, at 489.
141. See Clemons, supra note 138, at 490.
142. For example, for a short history of the use of hydroelectric power in the
American West, see U.S. DOI, supra note 138.
143. By 1994, the World Bank had loaned approximately $58 billion to 93 countries to construct 600 dams, although the World Bank claims a much lesser
role. See Erin K. MacDonald, Playing by the Rules: The World Bank’s Failure
to Adhere to Policy in the Funding of Large-Scale Hydropower Projects, 31 Envtl. L. 1011, 1012 (2001). According to the World Bank’s website, it only
funded construction of eight dams per year in the 1970s and 1980s, and
since 1986, has only financed 33 hydropower projects. It also asserts that it
has played a role in funding only 3% of all dams in developing countries. 
See The World Bank Group, World Bank Lending for Large Dams: A Preliminary Review of Impacts (June 13, 2012), http://Inweb90.worldbank.
org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) (noting that the World
Bank’s involvement in funding large hydropower projects differs from other
reports).
144. See MacDonald, supra note 143, at 1018.
145. See Clemons, supra note 138, at 491.
146. See MacDonald, supra note 143, at 1018. The World Bank justified approving loans for large-scale hydropower projects based on cost-benefit analyses. 
See The World Bank Group, World Bank Lending for Large Dams: A Preliminary Review of Impacts (June 13, 2012), http://Inweb90.worldbank.
org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
147. While damming rivers can mitigate the damage from harmful river flooding, it may also have a negative impact on a river’s ecosystem. See Clemons,
supra note 138, at 493. Dams have also tended to destroy agricultural lands
that are a major source of food and income for rural, poor communities. See
McDonald, supra note 143, at 1018.
148. A dam blocks sediment and nutrients from flowing downstream, which may
be essential for a rivers ecosystem and can erode riverbeds. Upstream effects
include a lack of sediment displacement, because as sediment builds in the
dammed segment, it reduces oxygen levels that  may result in the loss of
biodiversity. See Clemons, supra note 138, at 495. See McDonald, supra note
143, at 1018.
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close proximity of a dam site.149 Besides losing farmland,
upstream flooding has forced the relocation of towns, villages, and communities.150 Hydrologists estimate that the
damaging environmental effects of large-scale hydropower
dams have adversely affected approximately 472 million
persons worldwide.151

B.

The China Factor

1.

Large Hydropower

China has been building large hydropower projects both
at home and abroad, including in SSA.152 Indeed, many
SSA infrastructure projects have been large hydropower
ventures,153 making China a major large hydropower player
on the continent. Building on its domestic experience and
expertise in constructing large hydropower projects, China
has either already supplied or plans to provide financial and
construction capabilities for more than 70 projects in 29
African countries.154 Yet, China’s domestic environmental record in this arena has been problematic, if judged by
contemporary international standards, and some of their
African dam projects have also presented environmental
and other problems.155 Nonetheless, with many pending
projects, Chinese involvement in large SSA hydropower is
assured for many years to come.156
149. See Karlie Shea Clemons, Hydroelectric Dams: Transboundary Environmental
Effects and International Law, 36 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 487, 497 (discussing
harms associated with hydroelectric dams).
150. See Int’l Rivers, Infrastructure for Whom? A Critique of the Infrastructure Strategies of the Group of 20 and the World Bank (May 2012), available at http://
www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/infrastructure_for_whom_
report.pdf.
151. See id.
152. China has more than 45,000 large dams. It has gone through four waves
of dam-building; the third period (1980-2000) and the last, beginning in
2000, parallel its economic reforms. The projects, which are almost all hydropower ventures, have become increasingly complex as China began to
import technologies and cooperate with foreign engineers and suppliers. 
The fourth wave followed government efforts to streamline and decentralize the process, and it has led to the corporatization of China’s hydropower
sector and a surge in domestic and overseas dam-building. McDonald, supra
note 105, at 294, 297.
153. Vivien Foster et al., Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure
Financier for Africa (World Bank, July 2008), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/Building_Bridges_Master_Version_wo-Embg_with_cover.pdf (discussing and detailing Chinese
infrastructure projects in general and large hydropower installations in
particular).
154. By the end of 2007, China was making $3.3 billion available toward constructing 10 major hydropower projects with 6,000 MW of installed capacity. Once completed, these undertakings will increase the total available hydropower generation capacity in SSA by around 30%. Conrad et al., supra
note 11.
155. For example, the Kongou Dam, proposed to power the Belinga iron ore
project, could negatively impact the forests of Ivindo National Park. In Ghana, the Sinohydro’s Bui Dam, financed by China Exim Bank, floods about
one-quarter of Bui National Park. In Zambia, the Lower Kafue Gorge Dam,
a Sinohoydro project financed by China Exim Bank, will put additional
pressure on the ecologically important Kafue Flats and its national parks. 
The Merowe dam in Sudan has been the focus of severe criticism for doing
business with the government of Sudan, which has engaged in egregious human rights abuses, and because of the dam itself, which has had severe social
and environmental consequences. Bosshard, supra note 25 at 6.
156. “The database maintained by International Rivers reports more than 70
hydropower projects with Chinese involvement in Africa.  These include
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Still, there are also indications that large hydropower
projects are being supplemented by other forms of renewable energy as water resources become more unstable (due
in part to climate change).  For example, the Ethiopian
Genale Dawa and Chemoga Yeda hydropower projects
also included an agreement with China HydroPower to
develop several wind farms with an installed capacity of
51 MW each.157 Moreover, while large hydropower projects
will undoubtedly continue to play a major role in electrifying Africa, China’s resolve to export green technologies to
Africa and beyond may prove to be a valuable addition to
the mixture.

2.

Beyond Large Hydropower

China is expanding its wind and solar PV industries in
international markets, with lenders providing financial
support for ventures that include Chinese wind and solar
energy manufacturers.158 Environmental collaboration
and assistance are new arenas for Chinese foreign aid, but
as China turns to green technologies to close its technology gap with the West, progress on renewable energy in
SSA strongly coincides with efforts to establish Chinese
companies as leading green technology suppliers in global
markets.159 Africa has long been both a laboratory and
catalyst for Chinese companies initiating global expansion strategies, and thus entering the African renewable
energy sector is a particularly logical move. In addition,
China views its deployment of clean energy in SSA as
both providing electricity for Africa’s development and
reducing its dependency on imported fuels.160 From the
African perspective, China can deliver both the money
and technology to unleash its immense potential to utilize renewable energy. Indeed, this is already beginning
to take place.161
Chinese companies are expanding wind, the solar PV
industry, and other renewables in emerging markets,
with financial support from China Exim Bank and other
some of the largest power developments on the continent, such as Ethiopia’s
Gibe II (1,870 MW), Nigeria’s Mambila (2,600 MW) and Sudan’s Merowe
(1,250 MW).” World Wildlife Fund, supra note 111, at 13. For a list of
international dam projects undertaken by Chinese companies, see McDonald, supra note 105, at 297.
157. Conrad et al., supra note 11, at 33.  “In September 2009, the Ethiopian
Electric Power Corporation (EEP) signed a major power construction deal
with several Chinese companies” to build the Genale Dawa and Chemoga
Yeda hydropower projects. Interestingly, these contracts included an agreement with China HydroPower to build several wind farms with an installed
capacity of 51 MW each. “Ethiopia’s electricity sector is almost completely
dependent on large hydropower and droughts have led to recurrent shortages.” Thus, expanding wind power has been identified as a possible alternative to diversifying power generation.  These wind farms will be financed
through China Exim Bank.
158. World Wildlife Fund, supra note 111, at 12.
159. Conrad et al., supra note 11, at 31.
160. Luke Patey & Lars Engberg Pedersen, Exploring China-Denmark Development Cooperation in Africa, Danish Institute for International Studies 11
(Jan. 2012), available at http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Danida/Partners/Research-Org/Research-studies/Exploring%20
China-Denmark%20Development%20Cooperation%20in%20Africa%20
2012.ashx.
161. Conrad et al., supra note 11, at 7-8.
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Chinese lenders,162 whose most significant condition is
that ventures include Chinese wind and solar energy
manufacturers.163 The business motive is comprised of
three elements: exporting renewable energy equipment;
investing in local African manufacturing capabilities;
and developing renewable energy capacities. The renewable energy equipment industry is set to establish a presence in foreign markets that includes and then surpasses
increased exports, and China Exim Bank is prepared to
provide financing.164 Renewable energy equipment manufacturers are attempting to establish a toehold in African markets and then expand their exports of renewable
energy products.165
For example, China’s Suntech Power, one of the leading
PV producers in the world, has undertaken a 20 MW solar
PV project with South African developer Yingli Green
Energy International Trading Company Ltd.166 In April
2010, Tanzania’s leading solar power equipment contractor, Rex Investment Limited (RIL), announced a comprehensive partnership agreement with Suntech, whereby RIL
will be the exclusive distributor of Suntech solar panels,
supplying solar power equipment to the Tanzanian market
and neighboring countries in East and Central Africa. RIL
and Suntech are focusing on “untapped demand in rural
communities that are not connected to national power
grids.”167 While China’s initial attempt at a joint venture
to build Kenya’s first PV manufacturing plant failed, Chinese efforts to establish PV production capacities in Africa
are likely to continue.168 Suntech has also committed to
developing a 100 MW solar power plant in South Africa
with Chinese companies as the leading suppliers of PV and
other solar panels.169 Although renewable solar energy proj162. World Wildlife Fund, supra note 111, at 13.  China Exim Bank now
makes loans for African clean energy projects, and is willing to offer credit for wind power ventures that employ Chinese wind power generators
and equipment. China’s Wind Power Equipment Makers Eye Overseas Market, People’s Daily Online, Oct.  22, 2009, http://english.people.com.
cn/90001/90778/90860/6791271.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
163. World Wildlife Fund, supra note 111, at 18. For example, the Chinese
wind power company, Ming Yang, secured a $5 billion loan from the China
Development Bank for 2011-2015 to support expansion plans in China
and abroad. Chinese turbine producer Goldwind, one of the world’s largest
turbine producers, secured a deal with Ethiopia in 2011 and has opened an
office in Cape Town, South Africa. Id.
164. Conrad et al., supra note 11, at 7. Of course, not everyone agrees with this
assessment.  For example, some maintain that by investing in green projects in Africa, China is more interested in business opportunities than
green growth, which is something only African governments can deliver. 
Akoyoko, supra note 83. African governments must compel China to add
“green growth” to their investment strategy and portfolio because investors
are unlikely to be concerned with such goals. Thus, the countries where that
investment is taking place must insist upon it. Id.; Bosshard, supra note 25,
at 14. Western investors eagerly embraced this model, which allowed them
to evade stricter social and environmental regulations at home.
165. Conrad et al., supra note 11, at 15, 31. There have been increased exports by
China’s rapidly growing solar water heater manufacturing sector, and there
has been some interest in off-grid renewable energy uses in rural areas.
166. Conrad et al., supra note 11, at 15.
167. Id. at 31. Patey & Pedersen, supra note 160.
168. Conrad et al., supra note 11, at 32-33.
169. For instance, China Suntech Power Holding signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with Umsimbithi Holdings to jointly seek opportunities to
develop solar power in South Africa; Suntech also confirmed plans to build
a 100-MW solar power plant. Id. at 40.
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ects are initially costly, solar energy will likely be harnessed
free of cost.
With a saturated domestic market and facing fierce
competition in Europe and America, Chinese wind turbine manufacturers have turned to African markets.170
Goldwind, one of the world’s largest wind turbine producers, has secured a turbine deal in Ethiopia and opened an
office in South Africa.171 In conjunction with Tanzania’s
National Development Corporation, the Dalian International Economic and Technical Cooperation Group has
undertaken the Singida Wind Power Project with a $100
million China Exim Bank loan.172 Hydrochina Engineering Corporation will develop a renewable energy research
and development center at one of Tanzania’s universities,173
and China has recently begun showing interest in the
renewable energy market in South Africa, investing in
both wind and solar.174 China Longyuan Power Group
Limited (Longyuan Power), the largest wind power producer in Asia, is part of a South African joint venture to
develop African wind power and has also announced plans
to build a modern blade and turbine manufacturing facility.175 Mulilo Renewable Energy (MRE) and Longyuan
Power will develop six South African wind parks that in
total comprise 1,500 MW of capacity.176 Longyuan Power
has also pledged to transfer wind turbine technology to
South Africa by means of a blade and turbine manufacturing facility in South Africa’s Western Cape.177
There have also been projects beyond wind and solar. 
China Exim Bank financed Tanzania’s $700 million funding for the Mnazi Bay gas-for-electricity project, which
is projected to generate 160 MW in the Mtwara region. 
China Exim Bank is also funding 90% of the $1 billion
natural gas pipeline from Dar es Salaam to Mnazi Bay.178
Small-scale projects are also becoming more common, as
Africa’s lack of infrastructure induces small-scale renewable energy projects to generate electricity and other energy
commodities for local communities.179 Proposals with
various African countries have included biogas technology, hydropower, and solar and wind power.  China has
also offered training on “clean energy, climate change,
forestry management, and desertification treatment and
prevention.”180 An example of training and joint cooperation includes an alliance with Kenya to develop a range of
170. Id. at 30.
171. World Wildlife Fund, supra note 111, at 15.
172. The cement-clinker automatic production line introduced by China during the 2010-2011 expansion of the Twiga Cement Factory in Tanzania
provides pollution-free production with low-energy consumption.
173. Sino-Tan Renewable Energy Ltd. of Tanzania, MCC 20-Hainan International (China), and Norsk Vind Energy (Norway) constructed a 100 MW
power generator in Tanzania.
174. Conrad et al., supra note 11, at 76.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 40.
177. Id.
178. The project is led by the China Petroleum and Technology Development
Company—a China National Petroleum Corporation subsidiary—the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation, and Siemens, and is scheduled
to be completed by December 2012. Id.
179. World Wildlife Fund, supra note 111 at 13.
180. Patey & Pedersen, supra note 160, at 10.
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solar products to harness solar energy.181 This joint research
project is focused on finding ways to adapt solar panels
designed for China’s topography to Kenyan conditions. 
Partners include an electronic technology company from
Kenya and the Natural Energy Resource Research Institute based in Gansu, China.  The Chinese government
has already approved the joint research program, allocating $386,000 for the project.  Once completed in 2012,
it will fuel schools, homes, health facilities, and tourism
destinations.182 Kenya depends largely on hydropower and
imported oil to generate electricity, but if this project is
successful, it will be able to exploit the vast amounts of
available solar energy and bring power to a large rural population that is still dependent on wood and coal for cooking and heating.

3.

One Hundred Clean Energy Projects

At FOCAC IV,183 held in November of 2009 at Sharm
el-Sheikh, Egypt, Premier Wen Jiabao announced that
China would construct 100 clean energy projects across
the African continent.  While large hydropower projects
have generally been financed by resource-backed loans that
are tied to China’s efforts to secure its energy and natural
resource needs, the clean energy pledge signals a fresh and
fundamentally different pattern of Chinese engagement
that encompasses direct investment in wind, solar, biogas,
and small hydropower.184 It excludes large hydropower; is
driven by green technology development and manufacturing, which are also part of China’s long-term economic
policy planning185; and indicates an expansion of China’s
approach to expanding renewable energy beyond large
hydropower.
Following FOCAC IV, China began to implement a
wide variety of Conference undertakings, including the
100 clean energy projects initiative.186 At the October
181. China and Kenya Setting Up a Joint Venture for Solar Energy Products, Chinafrica.asia, June 19, 2009, http://www.chinafrica.asia/tag/clean-energy
(last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
182. Id.
183. The eight-point plan focused on improving the living standards of the African people and covered agriculture, environmental protection, investment
promotion, debt reduction and cancellation, wider market access, education, and medical care and public health.  China-Africa Trade, supra note
180.
184. Conrad et al., supra note 11, at 7. World Wildlife Fund, supra note 111,
at 13.  A commitment to small-scale energy projects in Africa’s infant renewable sector differs from China’s customary role with its focus on major
infrastructure projects, such as railways, highways, or bridges. It also differs
from the previous pattern of China’s engagement in the renewable power
sector, which has emphasized constructing large hydropower plants. China
is also helping South Africa, which is the major emitter of GHGs on the
sub-Saharan continent, transition from coal to cleaner technologies.
185. Conrad et al., supra note 11, at 7.
186. World Wildlife Fund, supra note 111, at 17. This included initiating the
China-Africa Science and Technology Partnership Plan as well as the China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Plan. China also signed framework
agreements on concessional loans with some countries, and exchange of letters with a majority of the least developed countries on increasing the number of items that receive zero-tariff treatment. It also agreed to send some
countries agricultural technology teams, and to provide medical equipment
and anti-malaria medicine. China began constructing agricultural technology demonstration centers, 50 China-Africa friendship schools, small-sized
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28, 2011, China-Africa Think Tank Forum, a representative of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs disclosed
that China has worked out country-specific plans for setting up projects in 11 SSA countries,187 as it attempts to
provide clean energy that is based on its own experience
with clean technologies.  China is expanding its engagement in solar and wind power stations,188 and although it
has yet to be fully implemented, biogas, solar, and small
hydro are also on the drawing boards and commitments
have already been made.189 Given China’s efforts to reduce
domestic poverty on a monumental scale and bring energy
to hundreds of millions in impoverished rural areas, this is
a decidedly constructive development and may represent
South- South cooperation at its very best. A nation in the
midst of modernization is taking what has worked, albeit
with appropriate modifications, to other countries with
many of the same problems, and that is also attempting
to undergo the same transition. These methods are much
more likely to be effective as they are strategies undertaken in partnership with a nation that has recently and
successfully utilized them.  This is in marked contrast to
the various theories propounded, perhaps with the best of
intentions, by institutions dominated by nations that are
long past these struggles.

IV.

Conclusion

Although China’s role in Africa is often criticized by Western commentators, I believe this is a very good story for
Africa and perhaps for the rest of the world. While there
have indeed been problems, both environmental and
otherwise, and there are bound to be more glitches and
stumbles, China’s engagement with SSA may truly mark
a new beginning for the region. The relationship is wideranging and deep and marks a new turn for South-South
cooperation that is not among equals, but is surely more
equal than the almost neocolonial role that has evolved to
govern the relationship between the nations of SSA and
IFIs, such as the World Bank and the IMF. There is at least
a semblance of respect and mutual benefit in the FOCAC,
and it is much more likely than not that African governments will increasingly turn to their new partner. This, in
turn, is likely to elicit changes in the conventional modalities of these institutions.  Perhaps, this is for the best, as
China is itself in the midst of modernization and is better suited to help African nations discern the appropriate
modalities for African modernization.190 China may also
well digging projects for water supply, and made progress on providing human resources training for Africa.  In addition, China kicked off “African
Culture in Focus 2010” activities, officially launched the 20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education, and
held the China-Africa Modern Agriculture Cooperation Forum in Beijing.
187. World Wildlife Fund, supra note 111, at 18.  Elizabeth C.  Economy,
China’s Green Energy and Environmental Policies, Council on Foreign Relations (Apr. 8, 2010), available at http://tinyurl.com/chinagreenenergy (last
visited Oct. 24, 2012); Patey & Pedersen, supra note 160.
188. Patey & Pedersen, supra note 160.
189. Meibo & Xie, supra note 45, at 10.
190. The Angola model stems from China’s experience with Japan, where it was
on the receiving end of modern technologies and supplier of natural re-

be in the best position to alter the development policies of
IFIs, if only because Chinese strategies are more effective. 
Indeed, it is difficult to perceive why the Angola model is
not an improvement on more traditional FDI, when it has
resulted in the construction of desperately sought infrastructure to the benefit of millions across the continent. If
these policies succeed, and are desired by African governments and populations, it makes little sense not to adopt
them across the board.
Matters on the environmental front are mixed, but I
believe they are more positive than not. China is extracting fossil fuels whose use will undoubtedly lead to more
GHG emissions and thus contribute to global warming. 
Yet, it is almost certain that this would have transpired
with or without China, as it is very likely these resources
would have been extracted in any case.  Thus, while this
is a negative, perhaps it is not distinctly Chinese.  There
have also been other environmental missteps, which is not
surprising given the environmental record of public and
private Chinese corporations at home and now unfortunately abroad. But it has led to a different kind of accommodation, as both China and African countries eschew
international standards and work out strategies between
themselves. This may signal a maturing of African governments, something Western commentators would be slow
to recognize, much less encourage or nurture, but something China seems to be encouraging and assisting and
that may be taking place nonetheless. Moreover, as China
attempts to correct its domestic environmental missteps, it
will also be more likely to incorporate these standards into
its “going out” strategy. If nations do not believe they will
lose FDI by insisting on environmental protection, they are
unlikely to resist cleaner projects in favor of polluting ones,
and Chinese SOEs can deliver on this.
On the constructive side, China is exporting green
energy technologies, and SSA is greatly in need of energy. 
This has the potential to be a perfect marriage and an
example of something that has been quite elusive: sustainable development, or at least more sustainable develop-

ment.  If the peoples of Africa are to possess the benefits
and burdens of modern life, they will need energy, and if
China is willing and able to bring that capability to the
continent in the form of renewable energy, this is a win for
China and its corporations, for African nations and their
firms, and for the international community as a whole. It
means that development, something we purportedly have
been assisting the people of SSA with for the last 60 years,
may actually materialize in some form, and it will be without more of the GHG emissions that are destroying our
planet. The signs of this transformation are already there,
and it is why Africa is clearly progressing.
Of course, this is the most optimistic scenario. If could
be that China will abandon its efforts in SSA, will revert to
failed development policies, or that the ravages of climate
change will be too severe to overcome with the assistance
of just one power, even one as rich as China. But even in
the event of this unlikely scenario, there are other Southern Tier countries on the horizon, and South-South cooperation in its entirety is unlikely to disappear. In any case,
we in the West—and especially in the environmentally
conscious and concerned West—should applaud these
efforts and add our voices to discerning techniques that
might make renewables more sustainable, for example,
best practices regarding dams and innovations and experiences in bringing power to rural communities.  But even
as we add our voices, perhaps we can take a cue from the
Chinese and approach this emerging discourse as peers to
the parties already at the table, rather than as experts who
are there to speak but never to listen, and to better appreciate that there may be different priorities and solutions to
the daunting problems facing poor nations. Without a bit
more deference, I fear we, meaning those who care about
the environment and the poor, will no longer be useful
parts of the conversation, just when there is finally a bit
of good news, for it seems Africa is indeed developing and
on a more sustainable course than we could have ever predicted. In this author’s opinion, this is exceptionally good
news.

sources. It believes this exchange was ultimately beneficial. See also Brautigam, supra note 2, at 12.
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